How Socialism, Expanding Government, Economic Dependency, and Authoritarian Power Destroyed a Once-Prosperous Republic — and Why Venezuela’s Crisis Is Far From Over

THE PEGASUS FILE | STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

By Chip Tatum | October 22, 2026

An examination of Venezuela’s transformation from a prosperous oil-producing nation into an authoritarian state, the consequences for millions of its citizens, and the unresolved struggle for power following Nicolás Maduro’s removal.

I. A NATION DOES NOT COLLAPSE OVERNIGHT

There was a time when Venezuela represented opportunity.

Its petroleum wealth supported a substantial middle class, attracted international investment, and helped finance infrastructure, industry, education, and modern urban development. Caracas was a major commercial center, and Venezuela was among Latin America’s wealthier countries.

Yet beneath that prosperity were structural weaknesses.

The economy depended heavily on petroleum revenues. Public spending rose and fell with international oil prices. Corruption, inequality, and political disillusionment weakened public confidence long before Hugo Chávez appeared.

Venezuela’s tragedy did not begin with a single election. But the political transformation that followed Chávez’s rise to power dramatically accelerated the country’s institutional deterioration.

The Venezuelan experience demonstrates how economic dependence, political promises, expanding state authority, and the gradual erosion of constitutional safeguards can combine to undermine a nation.

It also demonstrates something more disturbing.

Even after a dictator is removed, the institutions and individuals that sustained his power may survive.

That is the unfinished story of Venezuela.

AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER’S PERSPECTIVE: MÉRIDA AND THE COLOMBIAN BORDER

During my intelligence assignment in Venezuela, I was based in Mérida, in the country’s western Andean region.

Our work included tracking suspected arms-trafficking routes connecting Cuba, Venezuela, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

We were particularly concerned about movements along the Venezuelan-Colombian border and the protection that, according to our intelligence assessments, elements of the Venezuelan military provided to those activities.

From that vantage point, the relationship between the Chávez government, its military establishment, and armed organizations operating in the region was not simply a theoretical geopolitical concern.

It was a subject of operational intelligence interest.

My experience in Venezuela shaped my understanding of how political authority, military influence, and illicit networks could become intertwined.

It also informs my assessment of the difficulties facing Venezuela following Nicolás Maduro’s removal in January 2026.

Replacing a president does not necessarily eliminate the relationships, institutional loyalties, or security networks that developed over decades.

Those structures can survive a change of leadership—and may become some of the greatest obstacles to genuine political reform.

Author’s note: This passage reflects my firsthand professional experience and historical intelligence assessments. It does not disclose operational sources, methods, or specific intelligence reporting.

II. THE PROMISE OF HUGO CHÁVEZ

Hugo Chávez won Venezuela’s 1998 presidential election by presenting himself as the champion of ordinary citizens against a discredited political establishment.

He promised to confront corruption, redistribute national wealth, expand employment, and use Venezuela’s petroleum resources to improve the lives of the poor.

Many Venezuelans had legitimate reasons to demand change.

The country’s existing political system had failed to distribute opportunity equitably, and periods of economic crisis had undermined public trust.

Chávez offered an alternative built around a much larger role for government.

During my time in Venezuela as an intelligence officer, I observed the political environment surrounding these promises and the expectations they generated.

I recall discussion of direct monthly financial assistance, including a proposed payment of approximately $50, and promises that government would provide employment for those who needed it.

The precise terms of that particular payment promise require documentary verification. What remains significant in my recollection is the expectation that the government would increasingly assume responsibility for individual economic security.

The underlying political message was powerful: the state would become the principal provider of opportunity.

But an economy cannot create sustainable prosperity merely by distributing money collected from petroleum revenues.

It must also produce goods, attract investment, protect property, encourage enterprise, and maintain institutions capable of functioning independently of the political leadership.

III. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM, AND THE EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT

Chávez initially described his political project through the language of democracy, equality, and social justice.

His movement eventually embraced what he called Socialism of the 21st Century.

These distinctions matter.

Social democracy, as practiced in several European countries, generally combines competitive private enterprise with extensive public services and social protections.

Democratic socialism encompasses a range of political movements seeking greater social or public ownership through democratic means.

Chávez’s Venezuelan model developed differently.

His government expanded state ownership, concentrated political authority, weakened independent institutions, and increasingly subordinated economic decisions to political objectives.

The result was not simply a larger welfare state.

It was a system in which economic opportunity and political loyalty became increasingly intertwined.

Government employment and public benefits can serve legitimate purposes. But when citizens become dependent on discretionary state patronage, the political consequences can be profound.

The same government that provides employment or assistance may acquire the ability to threaten those benefits.

The danger becomes especially acute when independent courts, opposition parties, free media, and constitutional restraints are weakened.

Venezuela’s experience should not be reduced to the claim that every social program produces dictatorship.

The more important lesson is that concentrated political power becomes dangerous when government controls economic opportunity while weakening the institutions that could hold it accountable.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES THE EMPLOYER

One of the transformations I observed was the expansion of the government’s role as an employer and distributor of economic opportunity.

The creation and expansion of ministries, agencies, public programs, and state enterprises produced employment opportunities financed by petroleum revenues.

But government payrolls are not the same as productive economic growth.

A country can employ large numbers of people without increasing the goods and services available to its citizens.

Public employment becomes particularly vulnerable when the revenue supporting it depends on a volatile commodity.

Venezuela’s petroleum income made the arrangement appear sustainable during periods of high oil prices.

The state could finance employment, subsidies, imports, and social programs while postponing difficult economic decisions.

Political leaders could claim success while structural weaknesses accumulated.

When petroleum revenues declined, the system became increasingly difficult to sustain.

The consequences were felt not merely in government accounts, but in ordinary Venezuelan households.

V. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LOSS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

During my assignment in Venezuela, I lived in a residence rented by the government.

The property covered approximately one hectare, with extensive gardens extending toward a permanent stream.

I recall the growing political emphasis on redistributing land and the possibility that portions of residential properties beyond the main dwelling could be made available for poorer residents to construct housing.

This is my firsthand recollection of the political environment and the policies being discussed or implemented around me. The precise legal mechanisms and their application to particular properties require separate documentary examination.

Nevertheless, the broader transformation of property rights under Chávez is well documented.

Land reform, expropriations, nationalizations, and government interventions increased uncertainty for property owners and investors.

Property rights are not merely privileges for wealthy individuals.

They provide the legal foundation for investment, lending, construction, agriculture, and long-term economic planning.

When ownership becomes subject to unpredictable political decisions, investment slows and capital seeks safer jurisdictions.

People become reluctant to build businesses or improve property when they cannot be confident that their investments will remain secure.

A country cannot maintain a thriving private economy while continually undermining confidence in ownership and the rule of law.

VI. NATIONALIZATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE

One of Venezuela’s most consequential economic failures was the loss of experienced personnel from strategically important industries.

Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. — PDVSA — had already been nationalized in 1976.

The critical transformation under Chávez was not the original nationalization of petroleum, but the political restructuring of the industry and the loss of professional expertise.

Following the 2002–2003 petroleum strike, approximately 18,000 PDVSA employees were dismissed.

The loss included experienced engineers, technical specialists, administrators, and managers from countries other thn Veneuela.

An oil company is not simply a collection of wells, pipelines, refineries, and equipment.

It is an organization dependent on decades of accumulated knowledge.

Experienced personnel understand reservoir management, maintenance, safety, logistics, refining, financing, and international operations.

When that expertise disappears, it cannot be replaced merely by appointing politically reliable administrators.

The same principle applies to foreign companies operating in Venezuela.

Nationalization and forced restructuring created uncertainty for international investors and their employees.

Foreign professionals faced difficult decisions concerning their careers, pensions, retirement benefits, personal security, and the future of their families.

Many had little reason to remain under arrangements that threatened their long-term financial and professional stability.

THE MARGARITA HILTON: WHEN GOVERNMENT TOOK OVER TOURISM

The expansion of state control extended well beyond Venezuela’s petroleum industry.

In October 2009, Hugo Chávez ordered the expropriation of the Margarita Hilton & Suites, one of the island’s prominent international hotel complexes.

The government decree encompassed the hotel, restaurants, casino, commercial facilities, and adjoining marina.

The property was transferred to the state tourism organization Venetur.

The decision followed a major international summit hosted at the hotel. Chávez publicly complained about the conditions imposed by its operators when the government sought to use the facilities.

The Margarita Hilton became a striking example of the risks facing private enterprise in Venezuela: even an internationally branded tourism complex could become subject to compulsory state acquisition.

In January 2010, the government also moved against the Éxito supermarket chain, subsequently acquiring majority ownership of the business operated through Cativen.

These actions illustrated the widening reach of state economic intervention, from petroleum production to supermarkets and international tourism.

Transformation of businesses associated with the Éxito supermarket chain and the former Margarita Hilton illustrates the wider pattern of government intervention in commercial activity.

Not every nationalization produces identical consequences, and individual cases require examination on their merits.

But Venezuela’s cumulative experience demonstrated the danger of replacing commercial and technical judgment with political control.

A government can seize an enterprise. It cannot simply seize the knowledge, experience, confidence, and professional commitment that made the enterprise successful.

VII. PETROLEUM WEALTH CONCEALED THE DAMAGE

For years, high international oil prices concealed weaknesses in Venezuela’s economic model.

Petroleum revenues allowed the government to finance extensive spending while maintaining imports and supporting politically important programs.

The apparent prosperity encouraged further expansion of state obligations.

Meanwhile, price controls, currency restrictions, expropriations, declining private investment, and weakening industrial capacity undermined domestic production.

Venezuela became increasingly dependent on imported goods.

That dependence created an extraordinary vulnerability.

When petroleum revenues declined, the country lacked sufficient productive capacity and financial flexibility to compensate.

The collapse in oil prices beginning in 2014 intensified an economic crisis already developing through years of policy failures and institutional deterioration.

Production declined, shortages became widespread, inflation accelerated, and the currency lost much of its purchasing power.

Eventually, Venezuela experienced hyperinflation and one of the most severe economic contractions in modern peacetime history.

The consequences were devastating.

Savings disappeared.

Businesses closed.

Professional families lost their economic security.

Hospitals struggled to obtain supplies.

Basic necessities became difficult to afford or obtain.

The country that had once attracted immigrants and investment became a country millions sought to leave.

VIII. FROM CHÁVEZ TO MADURO: THE CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITARIAN POWER

Following Chávez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro inherited a deeply weakened economic system and an increasingly concentrated political structure.

Rather than restoring institutional independence, his government intensified authoritarian practices.

Opposition politicians faced prosecution, detention, disqualification, and other forms of repression.

Independent media and civil society organizations encountered growing restrictions.

The opposition’s victory in the 2015 National Assembly election demonstrated that substantial public opposition remained.

Yet subsequent institutional confrontations weakened the elected legislature’s authority.

The controversial 2017 Constituent Assembly further concentrated political power.

The legitimacy of presidential elections in 2018 and 2024 became subjects of intense domestic and international dispute.

The broader pattern was unmistakable.

Elections continued to exist, but the institutional conditions necessary for genuinely competitive democratic government were progressively undermined.

A functioning democracy requires more than the act of voting.

It requires independent courts, meaningful political competition, freedom of expression, transparent electoral administration, and security institutions that serve the constitution rather than a ruling party.

Venezuela progressively lost many of those safeguards.

IX. THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION CRISIS: A NATION FORCED TO LEAVE

Perhaps no consequence of Venezuela’s political and economic collapse is more revealing than the extraordinary exodus of its people.

By the middle of the 2020s, approximately eight million Venezuelan refugees and migrants were living outside their homeland.

This was not simply a movement of people seeking better salaries.

It was a mass departure driven by economic collapse, insecurity, political repression, shortages of essential goods, and the disappearance of opportunities that previous generations had taken for granted.

Doctors, engineers, teachers, business owners, agricultural workers, and skilled professionals abandoned careers and possessions to seek stability elsewhere.

Families were separated. Children grew up far from their grandparents. Elderly parents remained behind while their sons and daughters sought employment abroad.

Many Venezuelans crossed international borders with little more than the belongings they could carry.

Others undertook dangerous journeys through remote mountain crossings, unfamiliar cities, and territories controlled by criminal organizations.

THE CRISIS REACHED ECUADOR

Ecuador became both a destination and a transit country for Venezuelans escaping the crisis.

I have personally employed Venezuelan citizens in Ecuador and listened to their accounts of the conditions that compelled them to leave their country.

Their experiences have reinforced a fundamental point: Venezuela’s tragedy cannot be understood through economic statistics alone.

These were people who wanted to work, support their families, and build normal lives.

They did not leave because their homeland lacked natural resources or economic potential.

They left because the country’s political and economic institutions could no longer provide the security and opportunity necessary for ordinary life.

DESPERATION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE PRICE OF SURVIVAL

One of the most disturbing consequences of Venezuela’s collapse was the desperation that followed millions of its citizens across international borders.

Leaving Venezuela did not guarantee safety, employment, or economic security.

Many migrants arrived in neighboring countries with little money, few possessions, and families depending upon them for financial support.

Some found legitimate employment but were forced to accept wages and conditions far below their qualifications.

Others entered informal economies, taking whatever work they could find to survive.

Among the most troubling consequences was the vulnerability of displaced Venezuelan women, girls, and other migrants to sexual exploitation and human trafficking.

Economic desperation created opportunities for criminal organizations and abusive employers to exploit people who lacked stable housing, legal protection, or reliable income.

Some adults entered sex work as a means of earning money in circumstances where they perceived few alternatives. Others were subjected to coercion, deception, threats, or trafficking.

These are not interchangeable circumstances, and the distinction matters.

The tragedy is not that people struggled to survive. It is that the destruction of their country’s economy and institutions left so many with dangerously limited choices.

Families that once enjoyed professional careers, stable employment, and ordinary middle-class lives found themselves scattered across foreign countries, often struggling simply to obtain food, shelter, and security.

The human consequences of Venezuela’s collapse extended far beyond unemployment statistics and petroleum production.

They reached into the most intimate aspects of people’s lives, exposing vulnerable individuals to exploitation and robbing families of dignity, stability, and opportunity.

When a nation collapses, its people do not stop trying to survive. Too often, they become vulnerable to those willing to profit from their desperation.

THE LOSS OF A GENERATION

The migration crisis also deprived Venezuela of enormous human capital.

When experienced professionals leave, a nation loses more than its current workforce.

It loses teachers who would have educated future generations, engineers who would have maintained infrastructure, physicians who would have treated patients, and entrepreneurs who would have created businesses and employment.

That loss compounds the original economic damage.

Rebuilding factories and petroleum facilities will require money and equipment.

Rebuilding professional institutions, public confidence, and the willingness of citizens to invest their futures in Venezuela may take much longer.

WILL THEY EVER RETURN?

The removal of Nicolás Maduro created hope, but it did not automatically establish the conditions necessary for millions of Venezuelans to return.

They must have confidence that property rights will be respected, employment will be available, public institutions will function, and political repression will not return.

They must also believe that the security forces will protect ordinary citizens rather than intimidate them.

Until those conditions exist, many Venezuelans will continue building their lives elsewhere.

A nation’s recovery cannot be measured solely by the restoration of its economy. It must also be measured by whether its people believe it is safe to come home.

X. THE REGIONAL WARNING: ECUADOR, NICARAGUA, AND COLOMBIA

Venezuela’s collapse was not an isolated political experiment. Across Latin America, other governments have pursued policies involving expanded state authority, concentrated executive power, and closer political relationships with the Chávez–Maduro movement. But their experiences—and their consequences—have been markedly different.

The tragedy of Venezuela offers lessons extending far beyond its borders.

Hugo Chávez did not simply promise to improve the lives of Venezuela’s poor. He advanced a political model in which government increasingly controlled economic resources, weakened institutional restraints, and presented political loyalty as a requirement for national progress.

That model influenced political movements elsewhere in Latin America.

But influence does not establish identical responsibility, and ideological similarities do not mean that every country followed Venezuela into authoritarian collapse.

Three countries deserve particular attention: Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Colombia.

ECUADOR: RAFAEL CORREA AND THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

Rafael Correa governed Ecuador from 2007 to 2017, promoting what he called the Citizens’ Revolution.

His administration expanded public investment, strengthened the state’s economic role, and pursued constitutional and institutional reforms.

Ecuador experienced important improvements in infrastructure and some social indicators during his presidency.

But Correa’s government also faced serious criticism concerning judicial independence, restrictions on the press, and the concentration of executive authority.

His confrontations with independent media organizations became especially controversial.

For Ecuadorians, the relevant warning is not that every government program represents socialism or that public investment necessarily produces authoritarianism.

It is that democratic institutions become vulnerable when political leaders attempt to weaken independent scrutiny or subordinate other branches of government to the presidency.

Ecuador did not experience Venezuela’s degree of economic and institutional collapse.

That difference matters.

It demonstrates that the consequences of expanded government depend heavily on institutional safeguards, economic policy, political accountability, and whether elected leaders accept meaningful limits on their authority.

NICARAGUA: DANIEL ORTEGA AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE

Nicaragua presents a more direct warning about the destruction of democratic institutions.

Daniel Ortega returned to the presidency in 2007 and subsequently consolidated political power.

His government has been accused by international human-rights organizations of widespread repression, arbitrary detention, attacks on civil society, and persecution of political opponents.

The violent suppression of protests beginning in 2018 marked a particularly significant turning point.

Opposition figures, journalists, religious organizations, and independent institutions faced escalating restrictions.

Ortega’s government has maintained close political ties with Venezuela’s Chavista movement.

The comparison is important because both governments illustrate how political systems can retain the language of popular sovereignty while progressively limiting the public’s ability to challenge those in power.

When courts, electoral institutions, security forces, and legislatures cease to operate independently, elections alone cannot guarantee democratic government.

Nicaragua demonstrates how institutional capture can become self-reinforcing.

COLOMBIA: GUSTAVO PETRO AND THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION

Colombia presents a different and more complicated case.

Gustavo Petro, who served as president from 2022 to 2026, emerged from Colombia’s political left and advocated substantial economic and social reforms.

His administration sought to expand social protections, change aspects of Colombia’s energy policy, and pursue negotiations with armed groups under its Total Peace initiative.

Unlike Venezuela under Maduro or Nicaragua under Ortega, Colombia retained significant independent political institutions, an active opposition, competitive elections, and substantial checks on presidential authority.

Nevertheless, Petro’s relationship with the Maduro government deserves scrutiny.

His administration restored diplomatic relations with Venezuela in 2022, reopened channels of cooperation, and sought engagement on trade, migration, and border security.

These decisions were presented in part as pragmatic responses to the realities of a shared border extending more than 2,000 kilometers.

Colombia could not simply ignore the Venezuelan government.

Millions of Venezuelans had fled their country, with Colombia receiving the largest share of the displaced population.

Cross-border criminal activity, armed organizations, smuggling, and irregular migration created challenges requiring communication between the two governments.

But diplomatic engagement also raised difficult political questions.

Could Colombia cooperate with Maduro’s government without helping normalize its authoritarian practices?

Could Petro maintain constructive relations while publicly defending democratic rights and credible elections in Venezuela?

And did his approach provide sufficient pressure for meaningful political reform?

Those questions became especially important following Venezuela’s disputed 2024 presidential election.

Petro’s administration did not simply endorse every claim made by Maduro. Petro called for electoral transparency and the publication of detailed voting results.

Nevertheless, his broader approach emphasized dialogue and engagement rather than the complete diplomatic isolation of Caracas.

Critics argued that this approach risked granting legitimacy to an authoritarian government.

Supporters argued that communication was necessary to address migration, border security, and the possibility of a negotiated political settlement.

Both arguments deserve examination.

What cannot be responsibly concluded without further evidence is that Petro directly participated in Venezuelan political repression or commanded the security organizations associated with Maduro and Cabello.

COLOMBIA’S BORDER: WHERE POLITICS MEETS SECURITY

The Colombian–Venezuelan border is more than a diplomatic boundary.

For decades, portions of the region have been affected by guerrilla organizations, illegal armed groups, narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and competition over territory.

The ELN and dissident factions associated with the former FARC insurgency have operated in areas near or across the border.

Colombian and international reporting has repeatedly raised questions about the presence of such organizations inside Venezuelan territory and the conduct of Venezuelan officials toward them.

These issues warrant serious investigation.

However, the activities of armed groups must be distinguished from specific allegations that named government officials directed or supported particular operations.

Such claims require reliable documentary, judicial, or independently corroborated evidence.

The broader strategic problem is clear.

Weak border enforcement and competing armed organizations can undermine both countries’ security.

Any lasting political transition in Venezuela must therefore address not only Caracas but also the armed networks operating along its borders.

FOUR COUNTRIES, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Colombia should not be treated as politically interchangeable.

Their histories, institutions, economic structures, and levels of political repression differ substantially.

Yet the comparison reveals a common democratic challenge.

Government power can expand through legitimate elections and popular demands for social improvement.

That expansion becomes dangerous when leaders weaken the institutions designed to restrain them.

The critical questions are whether courts remain independent, whether journalists can investigate government misconduct, whether opposition parties can compete freely, whether private property is protected by law, and whether security forces answer to constitutional authority rather than political personalities.

These safeguards matter regardless of whether a government describes itself as socialist, conservative, progressive, or nationalist.

THE LESSON FOR LATIN AMERICA

Venezuela demonstrates how a wealthy nation can deteriorate when economic mismanagement combines with institutional capture, political repression, and the concentration of power.

Nicaragua illustrates the danger of entrenched authoritarian rule.

Ecuador demonstrates both the political appeal of an expanded state and the importance of preserving institutional independence.

Colombia illustrates the difficult balance between ideological politics, democratic accountability, and the practical necessity of dealing with an authoritarian neighbor.

The warning is not that every left-wing government will become Venezuela.

Nor is authoritarianism exclusive to the political left.

The warning is that any government becomes dangerous when its leaders place their own authority above the institutions and constitutional limits that protect the people.

Venezuela’s tragedy should be studied not merely as the failure of individual leaders, but as a warning about what happens when a nation loses the ability to hold its government accountable.

XI. JANUARY 2026: MADURO REMOVED, BUT THE SYSTEM SURVIVES

The U.S. military operation of January 3, 2026, resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores.

It was an extraordinary turning point.

But removing Maduro did not automatically restore Venezuelan democracy.

Delcy Rodríguez emerged as the country’s interim leader while influential figures from the previous political and security establishment remained in positions of power.

The operation removed the most visible symbol of the regime.

It did not necessarily eliminate the institutions, political relationships, economic interests, and coercive networks that had sustained it.

That distinction is fundamental.

An authoritarian government is rarely the creation of one individual alone.

It depends on people who control security services, intelligence organizations, courts, prisons, government contracts, and political patronage.

Some may seek accommodation with a new political order.

Others may resist reforms that threaten their authority, wealth, or freedom.

Venezuela’s future depends on how those competing interests are resolved.

XII. THE CABELLO PROBLEM: WHO REALLY CONTROLS VENEZUELA?

Maduro is gone. Diosdado Cabello remains. And that may be the greatest obstacle to Venezuela’s liberation.

The removal of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, fundamentally altered Venezuela’s political leadership. But it did not dismantle the network of political officials, military commanders, intelligence organizations, security services, and armed loyalists that sustained the Chávez–Maduro system.

At the center of that surviving structure stands Diosdado Cabello.

Cabello is not merely another government minister. He is one of the most influential figures in the history of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution, a longtime confidant of Hugo Chávez, a leading figure in the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), and a powerful participant in the country’s internal security establishment.

As Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, Cabello has exercised authority over important domestic security institutions.

His influence also extends through political relationships developed over decades, including reported connections with pro-government armed organizations known as colectivos.

Some of these groups have been implicated in intimidation, attacks on political opponents, and the suppression of demonstrations.

Not every colectivo operates identically, and the precise extent of Cabello’s command over individual groups is difficult to establish independently. Nevertheless, their potential role in any internal political confrontation cannot be ignored.

THE MAN BEHIND THE SECURITY APPARATUS

In an authoritarian system, formal political titles do not always reveal where power resides.

A president may possess constitutional authority while another official commands the loyalty of security personnel, intelligence officers, party organizers, and armed political supporters.

That distinction is essential to understanding Venezuela’s current predicament.

Delcy Rodríguez occupies the presidency, but Cabello retains relationships and influence that could complicate efforts to restructure the country’s security institutions.

An attempt to remove him might not resemble an ordinary cabinet dismissal.

It could become a confrontation among powerful factions whose interests, careers, and personal security depend upon the survival of the existing political order.

This does not establish that Cabello controls every Venezuelan security organization or that an armed confrontation is inevitable.

It does mean that his position cannot be evaluated solely by examining the formal hierarchy of government.

The fundamental question is whether Venezuela’s security forces answer to independent constitutional authority or remain influenced by individuals and political networks associated with the previous regime.

WASHINGTON WAS TALKING TO CABELLO BEFORE MADURO’S CAPTURE

One of the most revealing developments following the January operation was a Reuters investigation published on January 17, 2026.

According to Reuters, U.S. officials had engaged in direct communications with Cabello beginning months before the operation that captured Maduro.

Those contacts reportedly addressed matters relevant to Venezuela’s security and political stability.

This reporting raises an extraordinary strategic question.

Why would Washington engage with a senior figure it had previously accused of participating in serious narcotics-related crimes?

One possible explanation is that American officials recognized Cabello’s capacity to influence the response of Venezuela’s security establishment to Maduro’s removal.

A military operation could capture the president.

But preventing an immediate internal power struggle required understanding how the remaining centers of authority might react.

Cabello’s influence made him a figure Washington could not simply ignore.

The existence of those contacts does not prove that the United States reached a secret agreement with him or promised to preserve his position.

Nor does it establish that Cabello cooperated with the operation.

But it suggests that American officials understood an essential reality before Maduro fell:

Removing the president and dismantling the system supporting him were two fundamentally different objectives.

THE CRIMINAL INDICTMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF EXILE

Cabello also faces substantial legal jeopardy in the United States.

In March 2020, U.S. federal prosecutors charged him in a case involving allegations of narcoterrorism, cocaine trafficking, and related offenses.

In January 2025, the United States increased its reward offer for information leading to his arrest or conviction to $25 million.

These charges are allegations. They do not constitute a criminal conviction.

Nevertheless, they create a serious obstacle to any political settlement.

A powerful official who believes he could face arrest, prosecution, imprisonment, or the loss of substantial influence may have strong incentives to resist a transition that threatens his position.

For Cabello, departure from office may not offer the same possibilities available to an ordinary retiring politician.

That does not mean violence is inevitable.

But it complicates negotiations and increases the potential cost of confrontation.

Washington must therefore consider whether pressure against Cabello will encourage cooperation, provoke resistance, or strengthen his determination to preserve his political and security relationships.

WHY DELCY RODRÍGUEZ HAS NOT REMOVED HIM

Delcy Rodríguez faces a dilemma that cannot be resolved simply by issuing a presidential decree.

If she attempts to remove Cabello before establishing reliable control over the security institutions, she could provoke resistance from powerful elements of the existing system.

If she allows him to remain indefinitely, she risks preserving the very structures that meaningful democratic reform would require her to change.

Her position may therefore depend upon a delicate political accommodation.

Washington seeks stability and cooperation.

Venezuelan citizens seek freedom, accountability, and the restoration of democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, officials who accumulated power under Chávez and Maduro may seek assurances that political change will not destroy their positions or expose them to prosecution.

Those objectives are not necessarily compatible.

Information and assessments reaching this author suggest that Rodríguez’s political survival, and potentially her personal safety, could be threatened by a direct confrontation with Cabello.

That is an assessment of potential risk, not an independently verified threat or assassination plot.

There is no established evidence presented here that Cabello has ordered violence against Rodríguez.

But a president who cannot freely reform the security institutions of her own government faces an obvious limitation on her authority.

Rodríguez may possess the presidency without possessing sufficient independent power to govern it.

THE PRICE OF KEEPING CABELLO

The immediate temptation for Washington may be to tolerate Cabello’s continued influence in exchange for short-term stability.

Such an arrangement could reduce the danger of a sudden confrontation among competing factions.

But it would also create a longer-term problem.

If the institutions associated with political repression remain substantially unchanged, what has actually been accomplished for the Venezuelan people?

A transition that leaves security services unaccountable, political intimidation unresolved, and powerful officials beyond effective judicial oversight risks preserving much of the old system under new leadership.

The question is not whether every former official must be removed.

It is whether individuals and institutions can be subjected to independent legal authority.

A genuine democratic transition requires accountable police, independent courts, transparent investigations, protection of political opposition, and security forces that serve the constitution rather than political patrons.

Those changes cannot be measured simply by the departure of Nicolás Maduro.

They must be measured by the freedoms restored to ordinary Venezuelans.

THE UNFINISHED OPERATION

The January 2026 operation demonstrated that the United States possessed the capability to remove Maduro.

But military capability does not automatically translate into political control over what follows.

The surviving power structure presents Washington with a challenge that cannot be resolved through military action alone.

Cabello’s continuing influence, his legal exposure in the United States, and his position within the security establishment make him one of the most consequential figures in Venezuela’s uncertain transition.

His removal might create opportunities for reform.

It could also produce instability if undertaken without a viable institutional alternative.

Allowing him to retain unchecked influence, however, could undermine the transition’s credibility and delay the restoration of democratic freedoms.

Washington must navigate between those risks.

So must Delcy Rodríguez.

For the Venezuelan people, the stakes are considerably greater than the careers of individual politicians.

They have endured years of economic collapse, repression, displacement, and uncertainty.

They deserve more than a change of names at the top of the government.

Maduro was removed from power. But until Venezuela’s security institutions become accountable to the law rather than entrenched political figures, the system that sustained his rule may survive.

And that brings us to the extraordinary predicament of the woman who now occupies the presidency.

Delcy Rodríguez is walking a tightrope—with powerful interests on both sides and potentially dangerous consequences if she loses her balance.

XIII. DELCY RODRÍGUEZ: A BIRD ON A WIRE

She occupies the presidency of Venezuela. But how much freedom does she actually possess to govern?

Following the capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, Delcy Rodríguez emerged as the country’s interim president.

Her position is extraordinary.

She must navigate the demands of Washington, the expectations of a population exhausted by years of economic hardship and political repression, and the interests of powerful figures who remain embedded in Venezuela’s political and security institutions.

She is walking a tightrope.

And the consequences of losing her balance could extend far beyond her political career.

A PRESIDENT BETWEEN TWO POWERS

On one side stands the United States.

Washington seeks cooperation, regional stability, economic arrangements, and progress toward a political transition.

On the other side stands the surviving establishment of the Chávez–Maduro era.

That establishment includes political officials, military commanders, intelligence organizations, and security networks whose positions may be threatened by meaningful reform.

Diosdado Cabello is among its most consequential figures.

His influence within the ruling party and domestic security establishment presents a significant challenge to any president seeking to restructure the government.

Rodríguez must therefore consider not only what reforms Washington expects, but also which reforms she has the political and institutional capacity to implement.

An executive order cannot necessarily overcome years of personal loyalties, political patronage, and entrenched security relationships.

THE DANGER OF CONFRONTING CABELLO

Removing Cabello from office might appear to be an obvious step toward dismantling the previous government’s power structure.

But such an action could carry substantial risks.

If Cabello retains the loyalty of influential security personnel and political networks, an attempt to remove him could provoke resistance, destabilization, or an internal struggle for authority.

Information and assessments reaching this author raise the possibility that Rodríguez’s personal security could become a concern in such a confrontation.

That is a risk assessment, not a verified assassination plot.

No independently established evidence presented in this article demonstrates that Cabello has threatened to kill Rodríguez or ordered violence against her.

Nevertheless, the structural danger is difficult to ignore.

A president whose security depends upon the cooperation of powerful figures she may eventually need to remove faces a serious constraint on her independence.

The question is whether Rodríguez can gradually establish constitutional control over the security institutions without provoking a crisis.

THE EARTHQUAKE: A DISASTER THAT CHANGED THE POLITICAL EQUATION

On June 24, 2026, Venezuela experienced one of the most devastating natural disasters in its modern history.

Two powerful earthquakes, measuring magnitude 7.2 and 7.5, struck northern Venezuela, devastating communities in Caracas, La Guaira, and surrounding areas.

By August, the reported death toll had reached 6,301, with another 73,356 people requiring hospital treatment.

The World Bank estimated $19.6 billion in direct physical damage, with residential buildings, public infrastructure, and commercial properties suffering extensive destruction.

The catastrophe struck a country already weakened by years of economic deterioration, mass migration, institutional decline, and political uncertainty.

For interim President Delcy Rodríguez, the earthquake created an extraordinary challenge.

Her government faced the immediate demands of emergency relief, temporary housing, infrastructure repairs, and national reconstruction while attempting to navigate a fragile political transition.

The disaster also introduced a new dimension to relations with Washington.

Humanitarian assistance and reconstruction required international cooperation, but political disagreements, questions of accountability, and the continued influence of Venezuela’s security establishment complicated the broader relationship.

The World Bank warned that without sufficient additional investment, reconstruction could remain incomplete over a ten-year period.

For Washington, the challenge extended beyond diplomacy.

How could the United States support the Venezuelan people without reinforcing the political structures that had contributed to the country’s institutional deterioration?

How could reconstruction funds be protected against corruption and political favoritism?

And could humanitarian cooperation help establish a more stable relationship between the two nations?

The earthquake did not create Venezuela’s political crisis.

It exposed the enormous consequences of confronting a national catastrophe with institutions already weakened by years of political and economic turmoil.

For Rodríguez, already balancing competing political interests, the disaster placed another extraordinary burden upon an uncertain presidency.

WASHINGTON’S DILEMMA

The United States also faces conflicting objectives.

It may seek to preserve short-term stability by working with individuals who possess influence within the existing system.

Yet the same individuals may represent obstacles to the long-term institutional reforms necessary for democratic government.

Washington’s reported contacts with Cabello before Maduro’s capture demonstrate the complexity of that problem.

American officials apparently recognized the importance of understanding and communicating with influential figures who would remain after the operation.

But engaging those figures to manage a transition is not the same as ensuring they will ultimately relinquish power.

The danger is that temporary political arrangements become permanent accommodations.

A government may appear stable while the institutions responsible for repression remain substantially unchanged.

A BIRD ON A WIRE

Venezuela’s national bird is the turpial, recognizable by its brilliant orange-and-black plumage.

For this analysis, it provides an appropriate symbol of Rodríguez’s predicament.

Imagine that bird perched on a wire above Caracas.

Below it lies a country struggling to recover from years of economic destruction, institutional deterioration, and mass migration.

On one side stands Washington, demanding cooperation and change.

On the other stand entrenched political and security interests determined to protect their positions.

The bird must maintain its balance.

A sudden movement in either direction could bring it down.

Rodríguez’s challenge is not simply to survive politically.

It is to determine whether she can help transform the institutions that made Venezuela’s authoritarian system possible.

She may occupy the presidential palace. Whether she is free to govern remains an open question.

Illustration: “A Bird on a Wire” — A symbolic depiction of Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s national bird, the turpial, balancing above Caracas. 

XIV. WILL AMERICA HAVE TO RETURN?

The United States removed Nicolás Maduro. But will it require another military intervention to complete Venezuela’s transition?

The January 3, 2026 operation demonstrated America’s ability to conduct a highly consequential military mission against the Venezuelan leadership.

Maduro was captured.

The operation fundamentally changed the country’s political landscape.

Yet the removal of a president is not equivalent to the removal of an authoritarian system.

The institutions, political relationships, security organizations, and influential individuals that sustained Maduro did not automatically disappear.

That distinction creates a difficult strategic question for Washington.

Can Venezuela achieve genuine political reform through negotiation and institutional change?

Or could resistance from the surviving power structure eventually produce another confrontation?

THE MILITARY OPERATION AND ITS LIMITATIONS

Military operations are designed around specific objectives.

They may involve intelligence preparation, complex coordination, specialized forces, and precise execution.

But even an operation that achieves its immediate objectives cannot guarantee the political outcome that follows.

I was aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford in a consulting capacity during the January operation, drawing upon my earlier experience in intelligence and military aviation operations.

My involvement included work associated with the aviation corridor supporting the rotary-wing component of the mission.

That experience reinforced a principle familiar to those who have worked in military operations:

Operational success and strategic success are not necessarily the same thing.

A mission can accomplish its assigned objective while leaving unresolved the political conditions that produced the crisis.

Maduro’s capture demonstrated military capability.

Venezuela’s continuing political uncertainty demonstrates the limits of what military capability alone can accomplish.

THE THREE POSSIBLE PATHS

Venezuela now faces several broad possibilities.

The first is a negotiated political transition.

Rodríguez could gradually establish greater independence, reduce the influence of entrenched security interests, and help create conditions for accountable institutions and credible elections.

Such a process would likely require difficult negotiations, guarantees, and sustained international involvement.

The second is an internal confrontation.

Powerful officials or security factions could resist reforms that threaten their positions.

That resistance might involve political obstruction, renewed repression, or potentially violent competition among elements of the governing establishment.

A confrontation between Rodríguez and Cabello would be particularly consequential if it involved competing loyalties within the security services.

The third is renewed American military action.

Washington could consider further military measures if a serious crisis emerged and decision-makers concluded that other instruments could not adequately address it.

Such action might be contemplated in response to a specific threat, a major security breakdown, or other circumstances judged sufficiently grave.

But none of these possibilities makes intervention inevitable.

Nor would the existence of instability automatically establish a lawful or strategically sound basis for using force.

THE COST OF A SECOND INTERVENTION

Another American military operation could create consequences far beyond its immediate objective.

Civilian casualties, disruption of essential infrastructure, nationalist resistance, and fragmentation of the Venezuelan security establishment would all be serious concerns.

Removing additional leaders might weaken entrenched networks.

It might also create power vacuums that competing armed groups attempt to fill.

The United States would need to consider not merely whether it could accomplish another military mission, but whether the resulting political environment would be more stable, lawful, and democratic.

A second intervention would also raise significant questions under international law and U.S. domestic law.

Those questions cannot be resolved simply by arguing that particular Venezuelan officials are dangerous or undesirable.

Military action must be evaluated against its legal basis, necessity, proportionality, civilian consequences, and realistic prospects for achieving lasting objectives.

THE DANGER OF A PROLONGED WAR

The greatest danger of another American military intervention in Venezuela may not be the initial operation.

It may be what follows.

American forces possess overwhelming advantages in conventional military capability. But those advantages do not guarantee a rapid resolution of a political conflict.

Venezuela’s geography presents serious challenges. Its mountains, forests, border regions, and densely populated cities could complicate efforts to establish lasting security.

More importantly, the country contains armed political organizations, criminal networks, and elements of the former regime whose interests might not disappear following another change in leadership.

Some could resist openly. Others might abandon conventional confrontation and pursue a prolonged campaign of intimidation, sabotage, or irregular violence.

Such an outcome is not inevitable, but it must be considered.

The United States has encountered this distinction before.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, initial military achievements were followed by prolonged conflicts in which establishing durable political institutions proved far more difficult than defeating organized military forces.

Venezuela could present a different but equally consequential challenge.

A military operation intended to remove a particular obstacle to democratic reform might instead produce a broader struggle involving multiple armed factions and competing political interests.

Washington would then confront questions extending far beyond the original mission.

Who would provide security?

Who would govern?

How would former security personnel be integrated into a lawful system?

Who would prevent armed organizations from exploiting a political vacuum?

And how long would American forces be expected to remain?

These questions cannot be answered by military superiority alone.

They require a credible political settlement, functioning institutions, and the support of the Venezuelan population.

The danger is not necessarily that America could fail to win the first battle. It is that winning the first battle could become the beginning of a much longer war.

Before contemplating another intervention, Washington must determine not only how an operation would begin, but how American involvement would end.

THE CABELLO FACTOR

Diosdado Cabello remains central to the strategic calculation.

His influence within the security establishment makes him a potential obstacle to reform.

His outstanding U.S. criminal charges complicate the possibility of a negotiated departure.

And his political relationships may provide him with substantial leverage during the transition.

But it would be a mistake to assume that removing Cabello alone would solve Venezuela’s institutional problems.

Author

Editorial illustration: Venezuela’s national bird, the turpial, bearing the likeness of Delcy Rodríguez, balancing on a wire above Caracas. This is a symbolic illustration, not a documentary photograph.

XV. THE WARNING FOR AMERICA

Venezuela’s experience offers lessons that extend well beyond Latin America.

A prosperous nation can deteriorate when political institutions become subordinate to individual leaders.

Economic dependence can make citizens vulnerable to political manipulation.

Government control over employment, property, and essential economic activity can become dangerous when independent institutions disappear.

Corruption and patronage can destroy the effectiveness of public administration.

And political movements promising justice and prosperity can ultimately undermine the freedoms they claim to protect.

But the lesson must be understood accurately.

Government assistance does not automatically produce authoritarianism.

Public services do not necessarily undermine liberty.

The decisive questions concern accountability, constitutional limitations, institutional independence, economic freedom, and the ability of citizens to replace their leaders peacefully.

A democratic society must protect those safeguards regardless of which political party holds office.

America should examine Venezuela’s experience not as a simplistic ideological slogan, but as a warning about the concentration of power and the fragility of institutions.

CONCLUSION: THE FALL IS DOCUMENTED. THE CRISIS CONTINUES.

Venezuela’s decline was not inevitable.

Its petroleum wealth, educated population, natural resources, and commercial potential provided the foundations for enduring prosperity.

But decades of policy failures, institutional deterioration, economic dependency, corruption, and authoritarian rule transformed the country.

Millions fled.

Industries collapsed.

Families lost their savings and livelihoods.

Political freedoms were severely restricted.

The removal of Nicolás Maduro created an opportunity for change.

It did not guarantee that change would occur.

The continuing influence of powerful figures from the previous regime, including Diosdado Cabello, raises difficult questions about the independence and authority of Venezuela’s transitional government.

Delcy Rodríguez now faces the challenge of governing while navigating the interests of those who may have the power to obstruct meaningful reform.

And Washington faces its own difficult choice: how to support a transition without mistaking a rearrangement of authoritarian leadership for the restoration of democracy.

Venezuela’s future must ultimately belong to its people.

They deserve independent courts, accountable security forces, protection of property, freedom of expression, genuine political competition, and the opportunity to rebuild their country.

Until those conditions exist, the country’s liberation remains incomplete.

Maduro’s removal ended one chapter. Whether Venezuela can finally escape the system he inherited and perpetuated remains the defining question of the next.

THE PEGASUS FILE — WAKE UP, WORLD.

Editorial note: This analysis combines documented historical events, the author’s firsthand recollections, and clearly identified assessments of current political risks.