Iran’s War Within
Armed Resistance, Foreign Militias, and the IRGC’s Struggle for Control
By Chip Tatum | The Pegasus File
Special Intelligence Report — October 16, 2026
Iran is confronting more than an external military threat. Behind the headlines of its confrontation with the United States and Israel, the Islamic Republic faces a struggle for internal control—one involving armed resistance, foreign militia personnel, an increasingly burdened Revolutionary Guard, and unanswered questions about who is actually directing the country.
The central question is no longer simply whether Iran’s leadership can withstand pressure from abroad.
It is whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can maintain control of Iran itself.
Iran’s War Within
Armed resistance in southeastern Iran has placed additional pressure on the country’s security establishment.
In Sistan-Baluchistan, armed groups have carried out attacks against Iranian security personnel, including elements associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These confrontations are part of a longstanding regional conflict, but their significance extends beyond the immediate battlefield.
Iran’s leadership must contend simultaneously with external military threats, internal armed opposition, civilian discontent, and the demands of maintaining security across a large and politically divided country.
The armed organizations operating in southeastern Iran should not automatically be confused with the broader civilian opposition movement. Their objectives and methods differ. Nevertheless, both present challenges to the government’s ability to maintain authority.
The important issue is not simply the number of attacks. It is the cumulative strain they place on a security apparatus already facing competing demands.
Foreign Proxy Forces and the Internal Crackdown
For years, the IRGC has cultivated foreign armed organizations to extend Iranian influence beyond its borders.
One of those organizations is the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division, a formation with longstanding connections to the IRGC’s Quds Force.
Published assessments have described Fatemiyoun personnel participating in internal security activities in southeastern Iran. This raises a question that deserves far greater international attention: Why is a government with substantial domestic security forces relying on foreign-origin armed formations to help maintain control at home?
Based on information I have received from longstanding professional contacts with connections to the intelligence and military communities, I am convinced that IRGC-directed foreign proxy personnel are operating inside Iran.
Their reported responsibilities include manning roadblocks and checkpoints, restricting civilian movement, and participating in security operations directed against anti-government protesters.
My assessment is that these forces have also participated in operations in which protesters were killed.
The precise responsibility of individual units in specific incidents remains a matter for further investigation. But the broader significance of the reported deployments should not be overlooked.
Foreign proxy formations developed to serve Iran’s regional ambitions may now be helping the regime confront threats within its own borders.
That represents an important shift in how the Iranian security establishment is employing its available forces.
Where Are the IRGC’s Fighting Forces?
The IRGC has traditionally been regarded as one of the principal pillars of the Islamic Republic.
Its responsibilities extend well beyond conventional military operations. The organization exercises influence over internal security, intelligence, economic institutions, and Iran’s relationships with armed groups throughout the region.
Yet my contacts describe a security establishment facing increasing personnel and operational pressures.
Their reporting indicates that senior IRGC commanders have maintained a limited public presence, that the pool of personnel willing to undertake combat operations is under strain, and that substantial combat-capable forces have been moved toward Iran’s borders.
These developments may help explain the reported use of foreign proxy personnel in domestic security roles.
Border deployments may also reflect legitimate military preparations against external threats. But the strategic problem remains the same: every force committed to one mission is a force unavailable for another.
The IRGC must balance external defense, regional military commitments, internal security, and the protection of the political system itself.
How long can one organization sustain all four responsibilities under increasing pressure?
The Invisible Supreme Leader
Questions surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei’s public visibility and his direct exercise of authority have generated considerable speculation.
But I believe the discussion has become too focused on the condition of one individual.
Whether Iran’s supreme leader is personally directing every major decision is less important than identifying the institutions and commanders exercising effective authority.
My working assessment is that the IRGC may already be the effective center of Iran’s military and security decision-making, regardless of the supreme leader’s personal circumstances.
In intelligence analysis, formal titles do not always reveal where power actually resides.
The more revealing indicators are who controls military deployments, intelligence priorities, senior appointments, internal security operations, and the armed organizations operating under Iranian influence.
A government may preserve its constitutional structure while the practical exercise of authority becomes concentrated elsewhere.
The critical question is therefore not simply who holds the highest office.
It is who gives the orders—and who obeys them.
Tousi TV and Reporting From Inside Iran
One of the independent voices following developments inside Iran is British-Iranian commentator Mahyar Tousi, founder of Tousi TV.
Tousi has devoted considerable attention to protests, the activities of the IRGC, and opposition to the Islamic Republic. He has also discussed his family’s experiences with Iranian authorities, including those of his father.
His personal connection to Iran provides an important perspective on the country’s political struggles.
Independent broadcasters, Persian-language journalists, and personal reporting networks can bring attention to developments that larger international news organizations may not immediately cover.
That does not mean every account should be accepted without examination. It means these sources deserve serious consideration and should be evaluated according to the same standards applied to established media organizations.
The value of intelligence reporting often lies in recognizing the significance of information before it becomes a widely acknowledged fact.
Why So Little Coverage?
Iran presents a difficult reporting environment.
Restrictions on journalists, threats against witnesses, communications disruptions, and the dangers faced by people providing information all complicate efforts to establish a comprehensive picture of events.
International attention also tends to concentrate on the most visible developments: missile exchanges, military deployments, diplomatic statements, and the possibility of a wider regional war.
Meanwhile, the internal struggle for political and security control may receive less sustained attention.
That imbalance matters.
A government’s ability to survive external confrontation is closely connected to its ability to maintain internal authority.
If the security establishment becomes increasingly dependent on foreign proxy formations, if armed resistance continues to consume military resources, and if effective political authority becomes concentrated within the IRGC, those developments may prove as consequential as events on Iran’s borders.
The Pegasus File Intelligence Assessment
My assessment rests on three principal developments.
First, Iran faces a continuing internal security challenge. Armed resistance in southeastern Iran, combined with broader political opposition, places competing demands on the country’s security institutions.
Second, foreign proxy personnel appear to be assuming domestic security responsibilities. Reports concerning Fatemiyoun involvement, together with information from my professional contacts, indicate that IRGC-directed foreign formations are being employed in roles that extend beyond their traditional regional missions.
Third, the IRGC may be consolidating effective authority while simultaneously confronting growing operational pressures. The reported movement of combat-capable forces, limited public visibility of senior commanders, and demands of internal security suggest an organization attempting to preserve control across multiple fronts.
These developments do not establish that the Islamic Republic is on the verge of collapse. Nor do they demonstrate that Iran’s various opposition movements constitute a unified revolutionary force.
They do, however, raise serious questions about the sustainability of the current security structure.
Intelligence analysis rarely offers absolute certainty. Sources can be mistaken, information can be incomplete, and even experienced analysts can reach conclusions that later require revision.
Our responsibility at The Pegasus File is to examine the available intelligence without political bias, assess its significance, and present the clearest picture possible.
We stand by our assessments while remaining prepared to revise them when new evidence warrants it.
The Question Tehran Cannot Avoid
Iran’s external military capabilities remain important. Its regional relationships, missile forces, and military institutions continue to influence events well beyond its borders.
But the strength of a government cannot be measured by its external capabilities alone.
It must also be measured by its ability to command loyalty, maintain internal security, and exercise authority without exhausting the institutions upon which its survival depends.
The question is not simply whether the Iranian government faces resistance. It is whether the IRGC can continue to project power abroad, defend Iran’s borders, and maintain control at home—all at once.
That is the struggle unfolding within Iran.
And it may ultimately prove more consequential than the confrontation taking place beyond its borders.
Wake Up, World. — The Pegasus File
Sources and Further Reading
- Critical Threats / ISW — Iran Update, October 2, 2026
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — Reporting on Sistan-Baluchistan
- IranWire — Reported Fatemiyoun Ambush
- Tousi TV — Independent Reporting and Commentary
Editorial illustration: The featured artwork is a conceptual representation, not documentary photography.